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INTENT TO PARENT IS WHAT MAKES A
PARENT? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE ROLE OF INTENT IN MULTIPARENTHOOD RECOGNITION
Nola Cammu*
In most jurisdictions, the two-parent rule does not take into
account the social reality of intentional multiple-parent
families where more than two parents share parenting
tasks from a child’s birth. Many cases show that children
in non-traditional parenting constellations are emotionally
attached to all parental figures and perceive them as true
parents. Unfortunately, the law does not adequately
acknowledge multiple parenting practices, and thus a
discrepancy exists between the social and the legal reality
of (often young) children in intentional plus-two-parent
families. This article argues that the law should aim to
rectify this discrepancy by legally accommodating multiple
parenthood, preferably (but not exclusively) on the
grounds of parental intent.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Susan Boyd brought into the limelight the history
of the recognition and possibilities of legal parenthood
within feminist legal scholarship. Her influential piece
“Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties,
Intentionality and Responsibility” offers important insights
into the complexities of biogenetics and intentionality for
the domain of legal parenthood, and how these
complexities are still saturated by gendered notions. 1
Although Boyd’s piece does not take on multiple
parenthood2 itself, its introduction alludes to the subversive
*

I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of the CJFL
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this article.
Nola Cammu is a PhD candidate in socio-legal studies at the University
of Antwerp, Belgium.

1

Susan B Boyd, “Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties,
Intentionality and Responsibility” (2007) 25:1 Windsor YB Access
Just 63.

2

Defining concepts within family law is important to understand their
meaning. See Andrew Bainham, “Parentage, Parenthood and Parental
Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet Important Distinctions” in Andrew
Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater & Martin Richards, eds, What is a
Parent? A Socio-Legal Analysis (Oxford: Hart 1999) 25 at 25–31. The
term parentage (generally) carries with it a genetic component, and its
establishment usually results in legal parenthood. Although parentage
alludes to the common law tradition, and not necessarily to civil law or
other legal traditions, I will use the term throughout this article instead
of filiation for clarity reasons. The same is true for parental
responsibility, which is the internationally accepted term used to
identify parental authority/custody (ouderlijk gezag). See The
Netherlands, Child and Parents in the 21st Century: Report of the
Government Committee on the Reassessment of Parenthood, Chapter
11 (The Hague: GCRP, 2016) at 3, n 1 [GCRP]. The term multiple
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potential of multiple-parent families. As early as the 1990s,
feminist legal scholars raised the issue of the lived practice
of multiple parenting, in contrast to its legal absence. 3
Since then, family law has experienced a shift toward
intentional parenthood. This shift means that the intent to
be a parent has received significantly more weight within
the legal framework, even (and more importantly) when
such intent is not accompanied by biological or genetic
parental links. Boyd nevertheless rightly identified
important limitations of the concept of intent as a liberal
base principle for family law, and also warned of
erroneously considering intent apart from its social,
cultural, and gendered contexts.4 However, it is clear that
many contemporary families are nowadays characterized
by a “complexity in adult/child relationships that law has
to date not accommodated.”5 This observation, although it
was made more than ten years ago, continues to be highly
relevant today. Over the last decade, family law has
undergone many changes as it has evolved toward

parenthood signifies the fragmentation of parenthood into legal, social,
intentional, genetic, and biological aspects. Following the GCRP, the
establishment of more than two links of parentage with the same child
will be identified by the term (legal) multi-parenthood. Multiple
parenting (practices) refers to actual childrearing by more than two
parental figures (who may or may not have legal status). When parental
responsibility is assigned to more than two parents, these parents will
have, following the terminology of the GCRP, multi-parenting rights.
3

See Rebecca Westerfield, “Is it possible for a child to have too many
devoted and supportive parents or too much love?” (1993) 33
Lesbian/Gay Law Notes (letter, June 1993) at 2, cited in Boyd, supra
note 1 at 64.

4

See Boyd, supra note 1 at 73.

5

Ibid at 90.
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broadening the notion of intent and what intent means (or
could mean) for legal parenthood.
I have chosen to focus on multi-parenthood due to
its meaningful significance for parental intent and its
current political relevance worldwide in the field of family
law as well as its current relevance for the jurisdictions of
Belgium and the Netherlands. In what follows, I focus on
(the absence of) the legal enactment of multi-parenthood in
the jurisdictions of Belgium and the Netherlands. Both
countries are discussed and compared on the basis of two
apparent parallels: they share a similar (absence of) legal
accommodation in this domain and have a history of
implementing new legislation in family law. Furthermore,
both jurisdictions are code-based and have a legal tradition
of Continental law influenced by the French Napoleonic
Code as well as ancient Roman law.6
In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the legal
challenges of multi-parenthood have already received
significant attention from legal scholars. 7 Within the
6

See Raoul van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private Law,
translated by DEL Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992) at 1.

7

See Frederik Swennen, “Wat is ouderschap?” (2016) 53:1 Tijdschrift
voor privaatrecht 11 [Swennen, “Wat is ouderschap?”]; Frederik
Swennen, Het personen- en familierecht: een benadering in context
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2019) at 397 (Groepsouderschap en multiouderschap) [Swennen, Het personen]; Ingrid Boone, Gedeeld geluk:
Ouderschap in intentionele meeroudergezinnen (Antwerp: Intersentia,
2016); Machteld Vonk, “Een huis voor alle kinderen: de juridische
verankering van intentionele meeroudergezinnen in het
afstammingsrecht” (2013) 33 Nederlands Juristenblad 2244; Masha V
Antokolskaia et al, Meeroudergezag: een oplossing voor kinderen met
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literature, a distinction has been drawn between so-called
non-intentional and intentional multiple-parent families.8
While non-intentional parenthood refers to the acceptance
of parental responsibilities without a parent having been
involved in the conception (for instance by a step-parent),
intentional parenthood implies a parent’s intention to
conceive a child as well as to fulfill a parental role.
Therefore, collaborative parenting projects between two or
more (LGBT) individuals are forms of intentional
multiple-parent families. The distinction between these
forms of intent should be nuanced, as it is possible a stepparent does and will have the intent to parent along with
the legal parent(s). However, the term non-intentional here
implies there was no parental intent at the time the child
was conceived, for the step-parent entered the life of the
child probably at a (much) later stage. This form of
parenting, although touched upon later, falls beyond the
scope of this article. My article mainly focuses on the
notion of intentional multiple parenthood, given the
symbolism and anticipation of initial parental intent in
these situations.
In the majority of jurisdictions worldwide, legal
parenthood is limited to two parents through links of
parentage (established by operation of law, recognition, or
court decision) and/or by adoption. However, nowadays
more and more children are being raised in families with

meer dan twee ouders? Een empirisch en rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek
(The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2014).
8

See e.g. Antokolskaia, supra note 7; Boone, supra note 7.
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more than two parental figures.9 Sometimes, as discussed
above, this is the result of a clear, openly expressed, and
initial intent. The desire to become parents when the
conventional pathways to parenthood are beyond reach,
fuels the intent to become a parent.10 Both in Belgium and
the Netherlands, parental projects between more than two
individuals are not officially recognized through links of
parentage, and hence not accounted for in official statistics.
As a consequence, their prevalence is unknown. Even
though intentional multiple-parent families are (and will
remain) the exception, it is likely their numbers will grow
in due time as a result of recent medical-scientific, social,
and legal evolution.11
In most jurisdictions, the two-parent rule does not
take into account the social reality of intentional multipleparent families where more than two parents share
parenting tasks from a child’s birth. Many cases show that
children in non-traditional parenting constellations are
emotionally attached to all parental figures and perceive
them as true parents. 12 Unfortunately, the law does not
adequately acknowledge multiple parenting practices, and
thus a discrepancy exists between the social and the legal
reality of (often young) children in intentional plus-two9

See The Netherlands, Kind en ouders in de 21ste eeuw. Rapport van de
Staatscommissie Herijking Ouderschap (The Hague: RSHO, 2016) at
66ff [RSHO].

10

See Boone, supra note 7 at 9.

11

See ibid.

12

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 149–50; See also Susan Golombok, Modern
Families: Parents and Children in New Family Forms (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 199–202 [Golombok, Modern
Families].
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parent families.13 Yet, I argue the law should aim to rectify
this discrepancy by legally accommodating multiple
parenthood, preferably (but not exclusively) on the grounds
of parental intent.
In the sections below, I first focus on the (absence
of a) legal framework regarding intentional plus-twoparent families in Belgium and the Netherlands. This is
followed by a brief overview of the legal ground of the best
interest of the child principle vis-à-vis multi-parenthood.
Next, previously adopted foreign legal strategies are
discussed, to show how parental intent has appeared to play
a role within the law. Although one should be attentive to
the challenges of comparing different legal traditions and
different social contexts,14 carrying out a comparative legal
analysis will help us better understand the borders of the
legal framework of plus-two-parent constellations, as well
as whether such borders should be implemented.
Generally, jurisdictions employ measures of ultra-light,
light, or full protection, based on whether parental
responsibility, legal parenthood, or both are allocated. In
addition, parental intent is taken into consideration to a
varying extent across different jurisdictions. The legal
comparative section of this article thus endeavors to
explore current family law regulations and the way in
13

Here I borrow the term plus-two-parent family from Chris Dietz &
Julie Wallbank, “‘Square peg, round hole?’: The Legal Regulation of
Plus-Two-Parent Families” in Nicola Barker & Daniel Monk, eds,
From Civil Partnership to Same-Sex Marriage: Interdisciplinary
Reflections (New York Routledge, 2015) 167.

14

See Katharina Boele-Woelki, “What Comparative Family Law Should
Entail” in Katharina Boele-Woelki, ed, Debates in Family Law Around
the Globe at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009)
3.
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which they already accommodate multiple parenthood.
The
penultimate
section
elucidates
policy
recommendations of other jurisdictions, with special
emphasis on the report of the Dutch Government
Committee on the Reassessment of Parenthood (GCRP)
and the government response to this report. 15 The
conclusion reflects on the possible implications for the
future of family law in Belgium and the Netherlands in
connection to the earlier discussion of foreign legal
strategies and the Dutch policy recommendations.
BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
Legal Parentage: The General Principle of Two
An important consequence of legal parentage in Belgium
and the Netherlands is the automatic link with inheritance
rights. Legal parentage also plays significant roles in the
field of nationality, parental responsibility, and naming
law.
However, in the above-mentioned jurisdictions it is
not possible to establish links of parentage with more than
two parents.16 The regulations that limit legal parentage to
15

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 434, 447 (recommendations 35 and 41);
The Netherlands, Minister Sander Dekker & Minister Ingrid van
Engelshoven, Kabinetsreactie op de aanbevelingen op het terrein van
draagmoederschap, meerouderschap en meerpersoonsgezag van de
Staatscommissie Herijking ouderschap (Letter to Parliament) (The
Hague, 12 July 2019) [Dekker & van Engelshoven, Letter to
Parliament].

16

See Arts 325/1 to 325/10 Civil Code (Belgium); Arts 1:198–199 Civil
Code (The Netherlands). In the civil codes of both Belgium and the
Netherlands, references are made to primordial links of parentage of
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two parents are first and foremost based on genetic and/or
gestational facts. Women’s claims to legal motherhood are
determined (1) by giving birth to a child, (2) through
recognition, or (3) by means of a court decision. 17 Men
obtain legal paternity (1) by being married to a woman who
gives birth to a child (the so-called presumption of
paternity), (2) by recognition, or (3) by court decision.18
Belgian and Dutch legislation also acknowledges the
intention to be a parent, also known as intentional
parenthood.19 The protection of so-called “intended family
life” has its roots in recent European case law on Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
which stipulates the right to respect one’s private and
family life. Consequently, “intended family life” can also
potentially lead to the allocation of parental rights and
duties when certain conditions have been met.20
the mother/father, as well as the family with whom links of parentage
were primordially established. See Arts 348-6, 348-9, 353-15 to 35317, 356-1, 361-4(d), 368-7 Civil Code (Belgium); Art 1:229(2) Civil
Code (The Netherlands).
17

See Arts 312 to 314 Civil Code (Belgium); Art 1:198 Civil Code (The
Netherlands).

18

See Arts 315 to 317, 319 to 319bis, 322 Civil Code (Belgium); Art
1:199 Civil Code (The Netherlands).

19

Swennen, Het personen, supra note 7 at 407ff.

20

Required is at least a potential close personal tie between parent and
child, as well as a demonstrable interest in and commitment by the
prospective parent. See Helen Keller, “Article 8 in the system of the
Convention” in Andrea Büchler & Helen Keller, eds, Family Forms
and Parenthood: Theory and practice of article 8 ECHR in Europe
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2016) 3 at 11; Anayo v Germany, No
20578/07 (21 December 2010) (ECHR) at paras 56ff; Schneider v
Germany, No 17080/07 (15 September 2011) (ECHR) at paras 81ff;
Ahrens v Germany, No 45071/09 (22 March 2012) (ECHR) at para 58.
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By making “parental intent” more and more a
connection factor in the allocation of legal parenthood, the
jurisdictions of Belgium and the Netherlands are gradually
making a shift toward the recognition of intentional
parenthood, alongside the traditional legal grounds on
which parenthood can be established. For instance, recent
legal changes conditionally recognize a “co-mother” (in
Belgium meemoeder and in the Netherlands duo-moeder)
to establish maternity through a presumption modeled on
the existing presumption of paternity.21 Before these legal
changes, co-mothers needed to adopt their children in order
to obtain legal motherhood together with the birth mother,
which was rightly deemed discriminatory. 22 In order for
this parental presumption to be applicable, the co-mother
needs to be married to the woman who gives birth (in
Belgium23) or in a registered partnership with her (in the
Netherlands24). The Dutch legislation additionally requires
21

See The Netherlands, Wet van 25 november 2013 tot wijziging van
Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met het juridisch
ouderschap van de vrouwelijke partner van de moeder anders dan
door adoptie, Stb 2013, 480; Belgium, Wet 5 mei 2014 houdende de
vaststelling van de afstamming van de meemoeder, BS, 29 December
2014, 106488.

22

See The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Wijziging
van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met het juridisch
ouderschap van de vrouwelijke partner van de moeder anders dan
door adoptie, Kamerstuk 33032, No 3 (13 October 2011); The
Netherlands, De staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nota naar
aanleiding van het verslag, Kamerstuk 33514, No 5 (received 12 April
2013). Belgium, Senate, “Wetsvoorstel houdende de vaststelling van
de afstamming van de meeouder”, Parliamentary Document No 52445/3 (26 March 2014).

23

See Art 325/2 Civil Code (Belgium).

24

See Art 1:198(b) Civil Code (The Netherlands).
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a process of artificial insemination with anonymous donor
sperm in order for the parental presumption to be
applicable. 25 In this vein, the absent parental role of the
donor is ensured. Consequently, when a child is conceived
by a lesbian couple and a known donor, choices will need
to be made as to who will establish a second link of
parentage with the child.
It is apparent from these recent Dutch and
Belgian regulations on co-motherhood that parental intent
is recognized only to a certain extent, that is, as long as the
maximum number of parents does not exceed two. To date,
the Belgian and Dutch legislation does not foresee a similar
legal framework for co-fathers. The practice of surrogacy
is currently unrecognized in Belgium and the Netherlands,
though this is likely to change in due course in the
Netherlands, following recent government proposals with
regard to surrogacy.26 Without a framework for surrogacy,
co-fathers and duo-fathers are not able to establish
paternity together through links of parentage. Currently,
one of the fathers is required to recognize the child, after
which the father can proceed by adopting the child.
Next to parentage, it is also possible to establish
legal parenthood by means of adoption. In general, the
number of parents is likewise limited to two. Belgium
currently has one exception: the legal instrument of
“simple” adoption (gewone adoptie) can result in

25

See ibid.

26

See RSHO, supra note 9; Dekker & van Engelshoven, Letter to
parliament, supra note 15.
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establishing multi-parental ties with a maximum of four.27
In contrast to the Netherlands, Belgian law allows for either
a “full,” or “strong,” adoption (volle adoptie), or a “simple”
adoption (gewone adoptie).28 The legal consequences of a
full adoption are the same as those of parentage, meaning
that the adopted child, once adopted, will be detached from
any links of parentage with the initial family. 29 For this
reason, this form of adoption is a “strong” adoption. Such
adoptions are the only possible form of adoption in the
Netherlands. 30 A “simple” adoption, in contrast, has the
consequence that the legal ties between the initial family
and the adopted child will not be severed.31 In theory, then,
the child will be legally connected to more than two
persons. In Belgium, “simple” adoptions are generally
practiced by step-parent families. It is important to note,
however, that a child can only be adopted once, either by a
single person or by a couple. Consequently, after divorce,
for example, “simple” adoption allows for a child to be
adopted by one of the parents’ new partners (or by a
couple) but excludes the “other” new partner from
becoming a second step-parent.32
To conclude, in the Netherlands the number of legal
parents is limited to two, whereas Belgian family law
27

See Arts 343ff Civil Code (Belgium); Arts 1:198e, 1:199e Civil Code
(The Netherlands).

28

See Swennen, Het personen, supra note 7 at 480ff.

29

See ibid at 481.

30

See Arts 1:229ff Civil Code (The Netherlands); GCRP, supra note 2 at
69.

31

See Swennen, Het personen, supra note 7 at 481.

32

See Swennen, “Wat is ouderschap?”, supra note 7 at 77.
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allows a child to have a maximum of two legal parents
(either by operation of law, recognition, or court decision)
and up to one or two extra parents through a “simple”
adoption. In this case, parental intent is solely used to
legally accommodate some forms of multi-parenthood
(such as step-parent families), but omits certain less
conventional forms of multi-parenthood (such as
intentional parental projects between more than two
parents).
Parental Responsibility: The Principle of Two Holders
Parental responsibility has been described as the legal
decision-making pertaining to the nurture and upbringing
of a child.33 This responsibility implies a range of rights
and obligations for the parents until the child reaches the
age of majority. The duty to provide shelter, everyday care,
and education are some among many parental
responsibilities necessary to guarantee the general wellbeing of children. 34 In Belgium, parental responsibility
corresponds with legal parentage by rule of public order.35
The Belgian Constitutional Court deemed parental
responsibility to be exclusively allocated to the child’s
legal parents due to a child’s vulnerability and physical and
mental immaturity. 36 The rationale is that parents are
considered the most suitable to fulfill parental tasks, and
33

See Swennen, Het personen, supra note 7 at 505.

34

See Art 203 § 1 Civil Code (Belgium); Art 1:247 Civil Code
(Netherlands).

35

See Art 373 Civil Code (Belgium); Arbitragehof (Arbitration Court),
Brussels, 8 October 2003, No 134/2003 (Belgium), at para B.6
[Arbitragehof 134/2003]; See also Boone, supra note 7 at 29–30.

36

See Arbitragehof 134/2003, supra note 35 at A.1, B.6.
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therefore, in Belgium, parental responsibility rests with the
legal parents and with no one else. A legal change in 2017,
however, altered this strict rationale by enabling Belgian
foster parents to exercise some parental rights that were
formerly reserved solely for legal parents.37
Following this change, foster parents can make
non-important (everyday) decisions with regard to
parenting but are also allowed to make important decisions
when urgency is at stake. Although the delegation of nonurgent, important decisions to foster parents initially also
fell under the scope of the legal changes, the Belgian
Constitutional Court decided to discard this in February
2019.38 The court deemed it a disproportionate prejudice
into the legal parents’ family life and therefore decided that
these particular decisions were to remain exclusively the
purview of the legal parents. 39 While the delegation of
other rights of decision-making was not affected, the
impact of the new statute for foster parents on multiparenting rights is limited. First, the recent legal changes
for foster parents have resulted in the splitting, rather than
a cumulation, of (some) parental responsibilities. Second,
the splitting of parental responsibilities solely took place
within the legal context of foster care and is therefore not
applicable to intentional plus-two-parent families.

37

See Arts 387quinquies, 475bis Civil Code (Belgium); Wet tot wijziging
van de wetgeving tot invoering van een statuut voor pleegzorgers, BS,
19 March 2017, 48369 [Foster parents statute].

38

See Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court), Brussels, 28 February
2019, No 36/2019 (Belgium) at 31 (set aside Art 387octies Civil Code
as implemented by article 10 of the Foster parents statute).

39

Ibid at A.5.1, B.27.4–5.
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In the Netherlands, parental responsibility is also
limited to a maximum of two people, who (contrary to
Belgium) do not necessarily have to be the legal parents. A
caregiver/non-legal
parent
can
attain
parental
40
responsibility through a court order. In addition, parental
responsibility can also be acquired by a non-legal parent by
operation of law when certain conditions have been met.41
In the above-mentioned circumstances, a
fragmentation of legal status and parental responsibilities
is taking place. As a result, a child in the Netherlands can
potentially have one legal parent with parental
responsibility, one legal parent without parental
responsibility, and a third caregiver/parent with parental
responsibility but no legal parenthood. The safeguarding of
parental intent is thus only in place to a certain extent, as
long as the maximum number of holders of parental
responsibility does not exceed two.
Which Forms of Parental Intent Remain NonAccommodated?
Both jurisdictions currently lack legislative frameworks in
which more than two parents can be legally assigned as a
parent before the child has been born. As a consequence,
oral and/or written agreements between more than two coparents, stipulating a reality other than what is provided for
within the legal boundaries of family law, remain
unenforceable in both jurisdictions. In what follows, I
probe the legal restrictions of multi-parenthood and multiparenting rights in greater depth.
40

See Art 1:253t Civil Code (Netherlands).

41

See Art 1:253sa Civil Code (Netherlands).

296

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019]

As stated earlier, legal possibilities for multiparenthood are limited in Belgium and the Netherlands at
the moment. In principle, a child can have a maximum of
two legal parents. Contrary to expectations, however, the
exception of the simple adoption in Belgium is not an
option for intentional plus-two-parent families. This is
largely because a simple adoption does not lead to parental
responsibility beyond two persons. Rather, parental
responsibility is transferred from the initial legal parent to
the adoptive parent, often a social parent, step-parent or the
partner of a parent.42 Another earlier-mentioned objection
is that current legislation only allows for a child to be
adopted once.43
Regarding parental responsibility, it is clear that
multi-parenting rights in both Belgium and the Netherlands
is restricted to a maximum of two persons. In Belgium, the
holders of parental responsibility will always be the legal
parents. Legal parentage is not a prerequisite in the
Netherlands, but the maximum number of holders of
parental responsibility is also limited to two. This means
that the concurrence between legal parentage and parental
responsibility for more than two persons is not an option
under the current law. As a result of the (lack of a) legal
framework in both countries, non-legal parents in
intentional multiple-parenthood families thus find
themselves in a precarious position. This becomes all the
more apparent, for example, when parental conflicts arise
among the legal parents in a family constellation, or in the
context of a court procedure. The only legal option for the
intentional, non-legal parent is to request the right to
42

See Swennen, “Wat is ouderschap?”, supra note 7 at 77.

43

See Swennen, Het personen, supra note 7 at 495.
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maintain personal relations with the child.44 The judge will
assess this request by considering the child’s best interest.45
Given the current legal reality in which a child can
principally have one or (maximum) two legal parents in
Belgium and the Netherlands, there appears to be a
discrepancy between the legal and the social reality of
plus-two-parent families in these two jurisdictions. This
then raises the question of how, and on what basis, the law
could possibly accommodate the latter families in order to
resolve this discrepancy. In answering this question, I
briefly turn to the best interest of the child principle (BIC),
given its paramount importance in parent-child legislation
and in the decision-making of the jurisdictions discussed
here.
The Best Interest of the Child principle: A Legal
Ground for Non-Accommodation?
The principle of BIC is a highly authoritative,
internationally recognized principle that dictates that
jurisdictions need to make the best interest of the child the
primary consideration in their legal workings.46 Generally,
having (and/or maintaining personal ties with) both parents
is deemed beneficial for the child.47 In Belgian and Dutch
legal doctrine, the question has been raised of whether
44

See Art 375bis Civil Code (Belgium); Art 1:377a(2) Civil Code
(Netherlands).

45

See Art 375bis Civil Code (Belgium); Art 1:377a(3)(d) Civil Code
(Netherlands).

46

See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20
November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 at 46 (entered into force 2 September
1990).

47

See ibid, art 9.
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having more than two legally recognized parents is
likewise in the child’s best interest.48 There appears to be
tension between multi-parenthood and the BIC principle,
as multiple readings of what constitutes the BIC are
possible in this regard. Regarding this friction between a
social practice, on the one hand, and an established
renowned principle, on the other hand, it would be
incorrect to state that the legal regulation of the former
would a priori go against the child’s potential best
interest.49 What matters, rather, is the relationship between
the parents: is it conflicted or harmonious? Also, other
dimensions could be taken into consideration by assessing
the strength and commitment of the relationship between
the child and co-parents; or the societal environment of the
family and the degree to which stigmatization or
acceptance is at play.50 This means that multi-parenthood,
in and of itself, is neither detrimental nor beneficial when
assessing the best interest of the child. A wide array of
contextual, situational, and other circumstances, making up
a complex set of variables, contribute to the well-being of
a child. Any true or rigorous assessment to ascertain the
best interest of a child thus needs to be conducted on a caseby-case basis. 51 Consequently, the question of whether
48

See e.g. Ido Weijers, “Meerouderschap en meeroudergezag in het
belang van het kind?” (2017) 4:1 Tijdschrift Jeugdrecht in de Praktijk
43; Paul Vlaardingerbroek, “Drie of vier juridische ouders? Slaat de
wetgeving in Nederland door?” in Ingrid Boone et al, eds, Liber
amicorum Patrick Senaeve (Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 257 at
280.
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See Golombok, Modern Families, supra note 12 at 202.
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See ibid at 202–03.
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See Andrea Büchler & Helen Keller, “Synthesis” in Büchler & Keller,
supra note 20, 501 at 536.
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multi-parenthood in general is in or is against the child’s
best interest is not useful and hints at its normative legal
status in Belgian and Dutch jurisdictions. I will now move
beyond the normative notion of best interest by probing
how foreign jurisdictions have approached multiparenthood from a legal standpoint.
MAIN FOREIGN STRATEGIES
Conferring parental status to multiple parents can be
regarded as taking place on a spectrum. 52 Various
considerations are at stake in the quest to find ways to
legally accommodate multi-parenthood. Legal protection
currently exists in the form of multi-parenting rights (in
which more than two persons can be the holder of parental
responsibility, regardless of legal status) and in the form of
legal multi-parenthood (encompassing a full link of
parentage between the child and the multi-parents). Multiparenthood might or might not be accompanied by multiparenting rights. Also, multi-parenting rights can be
obtained without the establishment of multi-parenthood.
As
mentioned
previously,
Belgium
currently
accommodates multi-parenthood only through means of
simple adoption. However, the legal instrument of the
simple adoption does not lead to multi-parenting rights.
Regarding foreign jurisdictions, a provincial legislative
framework for multi-parenthood is currently an option in
two common law provinces of Canada, namely British
Columbia and Ontario. Multi-parenthood is also possible
in some USA states (for example, California and
52

See Haim Abraham, “A Family Is What You Make It: Legal
Recognition and Regulation of Multiple Parents” (2017) 25:4 Am UJ
Gender Soc Pol’y & L 405 at 428–31.
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Pennsylvania). In these North American states and
provinces, forms of legal multi-parenthood exist with or
without multi-parenting rights.
In what follows, I briefly reflect upon the main legal
measures taken with regard to multi-parenthood in foreign
jurisdictions. These measures might come to serve as a
source of inspiration for Belgian and Dutch family law
policies. Nevertheless, some words of caution are in order
as we should also be attentive to the challenges of
comparing different legal traditions.53
When analyzing foreign legal measures taken to
accommodate multi-parenthood, there are several factors
to which one should be attentive. First, there is the question
as to whether intent plays a role in assigning parental rights
to parents in a multiple-parent family, and if so, which role
(at pre-conception or after birth)? Then, the question arises
regarding which legal consequences (legal parenthood
and/or parental responsibility) are attributed to this parental
intent in the case that it is recognized by law. Lastly, an
important question is how the recognition (full or not) is
manifested: does it follow an agreement, a judicial
decision, or both?
Given that the allocation of legal parenthood and
parental responsibility often goes hand-in-hand in the
jurisdictions discussed below, the first subchapter
considers the protection of both multi-parenthood and
multi-parenting rights following either a judicial decision
53

See e.g. Stefanie Carsley, “Reconceiving Quebec’s Laws on Surrogate
Motherhood” (2018) 96:1 Can Bar Rev 120 at 154–55 (transplanting
common law systems and traditions to those of civil law).
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or an agreement. The second subchapter probes the legal
practice of allocating multi-parenting rights by judicial
decision (in contrast to a parental agreement).
Legal Multi-Parenthood and Multi-Parenting via
Judicial Decision or Agreement
Since January 1, 2014, the US state of California has
allowed for more than two parents to be recognized by
judicial decision.54 This recognition entails not only legal
parenthood but also parental responsibility.55 The premise
of such recognition is a decision by the court. The judge
handling these types of cases is allowed to grant
recognition to a third party only under the condition that
the limitation of two parents would be detrimental to the
child’s well-being.56 These legal changes resulted from a
past case involving two mothers in a lesbian relationship
and a father.57 By legally allowing multi-parenthood, the
state legislature aimed to protect the children born in such
unconventional family constellations against possible
negative consequences stemming from the lack of legal
recognition of the third parent. It should be noted that only
families consisting of more than two parents who are
actively involved in the child’s life are eligible to be
recognized. When no family life has yet been established,
as is the case when prospective intentional multi-parents
54

See US, SB 274, An act to amend Sections 3040, 4057, 7601, 7612,
and 8617 of, and to add Section 4052.5 to, the Family Code, relating
to family law, 2013–14, Reg Sess, Cal, 2013 (enacted).

55

See Cal Fam Code §§ 3040(d), 4052.5(a).

56

See ibid, § 7612(c).

57

See In Re MC, 195 Cal App (4th) 197 (2011).
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are in the initial phase of creating a family, they are not
eligible. In short, initial parental intent is not supported
under this system.
Other US states, such as Pennsylvania 58 and
Louisiana, 59 recognize the so-called concept of dual
paternity by means of a judicial decision. In this vein, the
paternity of both the husband of the mother as well as the
biological father can be established. Traditionally, the
decision to opt for dual paternity has been due to financial
reasons regarding inheritance rights, but over the years it
has also has been increasingly driven by emotional and
symbolic considerations. 60 This development hence
resulted in a legal process that determined equal rights and
duties for more than two parents, in addition to equal
inheritance rights.61 In Pennsylvania, this culminated in the
possibility of multi-parenting rights, for example,
encompassing three-parent custody.62 The parental rights
58

See Jacob v Shultz-Jacob, 923 A (2d) 473 (Pa Super Ct 2007) [ShultzJacob].

59

See Arts 197–98 Civil Code (Louisiana).

60

See Karolina Sikorska, Thalia Kruger & Frederik Swennen,
“Meerouderschap en Meeroudergezag” (2015) at 31, online (pdf):
University
of
Antwerp
<repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/df75c4/6a65e3b6.pdf>.

61

See ibid at 31–32.

62

See TEB v CAB, 74 A (3d) 170 (Pa Super Ct 2013); Shultz-Jacob, supra
note 58 at 482. See also Tricia Kazinetz, “You Can't Have One without
the Other: Why the Legalization of Same Sex Marriage Created a Need
for Courts to Have Discretion in Granting Legal Parentage to More
than Two Individuals” (2018) 24:1 Widener L Rev 179 at 185; Jeffrey
A Parness, “Comparable Pursuits of Hold out and De Facto Parentage:
Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act" (2018) 31:1 J of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 157 at 170.
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of the third parent in Louisiana, however, remain limited,
which implies that a pure form of multi-parenting rights
does not exist.63 The legal establishment of dual paternity
is motivated mainly by the desire to protect the best interest
of the child.64
Other states, such as Delaware and Washington,
DC, recognize the legal concept of de facto parenthood.65
This concept can result in multi-parenthood and multiparenting rights when deemed necessary by a judge66 and
when all conditions have been met. 67 These various
jurisdictions thus have limited, to various degrees, the
intent to parent. It is also unclear whether it would be
possible to legally recognize initial parental intent. This
seems unlikely, however, because the concrete
establishment of family life appears to be a prerequisite for
legal recognition.
However, a 2007 case in Ontario, Canada,
involving a lesbian couple and a known donor who shared
the initial intention to co-parent, proved groundbreaking
for the legal recognition of multi-parenthood and full
63

See e.g. Smith v Cole, 553 So (2d) 847 (La Sup Ct 1989) (in which the
court recognized a child having two fathers: a biological father and a
legal father (here: husband of the mother), albeit with different
(financial) responsibilities); Sikorska, Kruger & Swennen, supra note
60 at 50.

64

See Shultz-Jacob, supra note 58 at 478; Robert E Rains, “Three
Parents? Jacob v Shultz-Jacob, 923 A 2d 473, 2007 Pa Super Lexis 957
(Pa Super 2007)” (2008) 20:1 Denning LJ 197 at 199.

65

See Sikorska, Kruger & Swennen, supra note 60 at 32–33.
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See Del Code tit 13 §§ 8-201(a)(4), 8-201(b)(6).

67

See DC Code §§ 16-831.01(1), 16-831.03.
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multi-parenting rights. 68 In this case, the court used its
parens patriae jurisdiction to grant a declaration of
parentage to the non-birth mother, which gave her the same
rights and obligations as her partner (the birth mother) and
the biological father.69 Here clearly observable, for the first
time, is a judicial affirmation of earlier established parental
intent. In the years since, British Columbia has introduced
a simplified legal framework for a third parent following
the new Family Law Act (FLA), 70 which was originally
enacted on March 18, 2013. The framework received
hardly any opposition, as the Legislative Assembly of
British Columbia opined that the implementation of legal
multi-parenthood is in the best interest of the child. 71
Following these developments, legal multi-parenthood is
obtainable in British Columbia. To be eligible, a registered
agreement is required between all parental parties who
form, or have the intention to establish a multi-parenthood

68

See AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2 (stating that a child can have more than
two parents).

69

See Natasha Bakht & Lynda M Collins, “Are You My Mother?
Parentage in a Non-Conjugal Family” (2018) 31:1 Can J Fam L 105 at
118; Donna Bouchard, “The Three-Parent Decision: A Case
Commentary on A.A. v. B.B.,” (2007) 70:2 Sask L Rev 459 at 478.

70

Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 30 [FLA].

71

See Fiona Kelly, “Multiple-parent families under British Columbia’s
new Family Law Act: A challenge to the supremacy of the nuclear
family or a method by which to preserve biological ties and oppositesex parenting?” (2014) 47:2 UBC L Rev 565 at 580; The Netherlands,
Staatscommissie Herijking Ouderschap, Rapport naar aanleiding van
vragen van de Staatscommissie Herijking Ouderschap over het
meerouderschap in British Columbia, Canada, by Machteld Vonk
(Leiden: Afdeling Jeugdrecht Universiteit Leiden, 2015) at 13, 33
[Vonk, Rapport].
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constellation using “assisted reproduction.” 72 Assisted
reproduction, in the context of this legislation, is defined as
“[any] method of conceiving a child other than by sexual
intercourse.” 73 This definition, in other words, allows
parents to seek medical assistance in the process of
insemination, but also to opt for self-insemination practices
at home.
Unlike, for instance, in California, judicial review
is not required in British Columbia. Only when one of the
parental parties takes the matter to court will the substance
of the agreement be assessed by a judge, with the child’s
best interest in mind.74 This regulation gives considerable
agency to future parents, as their decision to conceive and
parent together will not be subjected to judicial
homologation. For section 30(1)(a) of the FLA to be
applicable, however, the future parents are required to draft
and sign their arrangement before the conception of the
child takes place.75 If all parties agree to play a role in the
life of the child, the arrangement is open for various family
constellations: two men or a woman and a man, together
with a birth mother; two women or a man and a woman,
together with a donor.76
In principle, all contractually determined parents
are guardians, and all of them may exercise their parental

72

FLA, supra note 70, s 20.

73

Ibid, s 20(1).
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See ibid, s 44(4).
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See ibid, s 30(1)(a).
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responsibilities together. 77 A child can have up to three
legal parents, listed on the birth certificate.78 According to
legal scholar Fiona Kelly, through an unintended and
creative reading of the law, four legal parents would be
(theoretically) possible in the case of conception with
female and male gametes from two donor parents.79 Other
scholars disagree as to the number of possible parents.80
But even if the Vital Statistics Agency would consider four
parents to be eligible, based on the conditions above, the
statute would still not provide for the regulation of parental
projects between two biogenetic and two social parents. In
these situations, one social parent would become legally
superfluous due to not having a biogenetic link with the
child.81
This is remarkable because previous versions of the
FLA did originally include these kinds of four-parent
constellations.82 Following the FLA, “initial” intent is thus
recognized in a novel and progressive way, albeit only for
specific types of multi-parenthood intent, encompassing
77

See ibid, s 39(3)(a), s 40(2), s 41.

78

See Carsley, supra note 53 at 151ff.
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See Kelly, supra note 71 at 586–87; See also Kazinetz, supra note 62
at 197.
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See e.g. Barbara Findlay & Zara Suleman, “Baby Steps: Assisted
Reproductive Technology and the B.C. Family Law Act” (2013)
Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia Working
Paper No 6.1 at 6.1.34.

81

See Susan B Boyd, “Equality: An Uncomfortable Fit in Parenting
Law” in Robert Leckey, ed, After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship
(London: Routledge, 2014) 42 at 48; Vonk, Rapport, supra note 71 at
16.
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two or perhaps three biogenetic parents and one social
parent.
The trend continued in 2017, when intentional
multi-parenthood was also incorporated into the legislation
of a second Canadian province: Ontario. This was done
through the All Families Are Equal Act (AFEA),83 which
modified the Children’s Law Reform Act. 84 Multiparenthood, with up to four intended parents, can now be
established at birth without a court order, as long as preconception agreements are made beforehand. 85 The only
mandatory requirement is that the birth parent is included
as one of the paternal parties of the pre-conception
agreement.86 The new legislation also makes it possible to
establish parentage for up to four parents in the case of
surrogacy. 87 When more than four intended parents are
listed in the surrogacy or pre-conception agreements, a
court order is necessary to legally recognize all the parents
involved.88
Despite the similarities between the British
Columbia FLA and the Ontario AFEA, there are also some
interesting differences. The FLA appears to provide noncontractual parents, for example, those who entered the
parental project after the child is conceived or born, the
83

All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related Registrations
Statute Law Amendment), SO 2016, c 23 [AFEA].

84

Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C 12 [CLRA].
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possibility to obtain a declaration of parentage by court
order.89 This option seems to be excluded in the Ontario
legislation due to legal modifications following section
13(4) of the AFEA. 90 The FLA thus appears to be,
paradoxically, more restrictive but also more inclusive as
regards parental intent in comparison to the more recent
AFEA. That is, the FLA appears less inclusive due to the
restriction of three parents, of whom at least two require a
genetic link, while also appearing more inclusive by
opening up the possibility for multiple-parent families to
be established after a child has been born.
In addition to British Columbia and Ontario, a form
of multi-parenthood has been recognized in Newfoundland
and Labrador, following a case from 2018 in which the
court granted a declaration of parentage to all three parents
in a polyamorous family.91 The court found a legislative
gap in the current legal two-parent framework, as the court
held it was in the BIC to be legally connected to all three
parents. Although family life was already established here,
the court indirectly alluded to “initial” parental intent by
stating the child was born into the polyamorous
relationship.92

89

See FLA, supra note 70, s 31.

90

See AEFA, supra note 83, ss 13(4), 13(5)3; Bakht & Collins, supra
note 69 at 133–38.
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See CC (Re), 2018 NLSC 71.
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See ibid, at para 40.
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Multi-Parenting Rights through Judicial Decision
Rather than legally accommodating parenthood for more
than two parents, some jurisdictions have opted for a
framework of multi-parenting rights. This is the case in
England and Wales, where a separation of parental
responsibility from legal parenthood is possible. In contrast
to legal parenthood, which is exclusively reserved for two
persons, The Children Act of 1989 allows for the granting
of parental responsibility to a non-legal parent who plays a
caregiving role. In a parenting situation with four parents,
under the conditions of the Children Act, 93 all involved
parents would be able to obtain parental responsibility.
Judicial interference is required.94 Once parental authority
is obtained, the holders of parental responsibly may partake
in parenting decisions on their own, without prior
consultation. 95 Parental responsibility automatically
terminates when the child reaches the age of majority.
Multi-parents are thus recognized to a limited extent in
England and Wales, and under strict conditions are able to
obtain multi-parenting rights, but not legal multiparenthood.
Regarding non-European jurisdictions, a limited
form of legal multi-parenting can be found in the family
law of New Zealand, which provides for the possibility for
an involved known donor to opt in as a non-parental figure
93

See Jens M Scherpe, The Present and Future of European Family Law
(Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar, 2016) at 109; Children Act 1989
(UK), c 41, ss 2(5)–(7) [Children Act].
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See Children Act, supra note 93, ss 4A(2), 4A(4), 12.

95

See ibid, s 2(7) (with the exception of long or one-month travel, which
does require prior consultation; ss 13(1)(a)–(b), 13(2)).
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along with the child’s presumptive parents (for example, a
lesbian couple). 96 This possibility requires the three
parental parties to obtain approval of their agreements by a
court.97 The parental guardians can also appoint additional
guardians for a child. 98 The legal system of Argentina,
moreover, allows parental responsibility to be
simultaneously exercised by four people: two parents
together with two step-parents.99 As these examples show,
parental intent is legally recognized to varying degrees
around the world, ranging from the recognition of nonlegal parents to exercise parental rights before a child has
been born, to a limited form of parental responsibility for
social parents (for example, a step-parent) who become
important for children later in life.
Recommendations of Foreign Governmental
Commissions
As discussed, certain jurisdictions have implemented either
multi-parenthood, multi-parenting rights, or both. Other
jurisdictions have not yet made such arrangements but are
(or have been) exploring the possibility of making them
through preliminary legislative documents and
governmental committees.

96

Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ), s 41.
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See Kelly, supra note 71 at 573; Sikorska, Kruger & Swennen, supra
note 60 at 51–52.
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See Care of Children Act, supra note 96, ss 21(2), 23.

99

Arts 643, 673–74 Civil Code (2014) (Argentina); Sikorska, Kruger &
Swennen, supra note 60 at 52.
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Propositions toward a legal framework for multiparenthood have been issued by preliminary working
groups of governmental commissions in, for example, New
Zealand 100 (2005) and Australia101 (2005 and 2013). The
recommendations made in these countries have not been
translated into final commission reports and/or legislation
for their respective jurisdictions.102 These proposals were
perhaps (too) progressive at the time with regard to the
political climate. Germany also rejected the possibility of
multi-parenthood in 2017. The Working Group on Filiation
(Arbeitskreis Abstammungsrecht) of the German Ministry
of Justice argued for the preservation of the maximum
number of two persons with legal parentage. 103 Multiparenthood would unnecessarily complicate the legal
situation with regard to, for example, naming law and
parental responsibility. 104 The report nevertheless
mentions that social or genetic (non-legal) parents should
100

New Zealand, Law Commission, New Issues in Legal Parenthood,
Report 88 (Wellington: Law Commission, 2005). However, the
parenthood recommendations have not made it into legislation. See
Kelly, supra note 71 at 573.
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(Canberra: FLC, 2013) at 34–35.
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76.

104
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be granted some limited rights already laid down in
positive law (such as custody or visitation rights).105
In 2014, France proposed a limited form of multiparenthood, mostly aimed at step-parent families. The
French government commission Filiation, origines,
parentalité proposed to extend the legal instrument of
simple adoption to two step-parents (the new partners of
both the child’s parents) instead of one. This could,
potentially, be used by intentional multi-parenthood
families encompassing four parents. 106 However, legal
multi-parenthood through simple adoption would, in
principle, not be accompanied by legal parental
responsibility for all parents,107 unless the parents arranged
this among them.108
While France took a modest step in the direction of
multi-parenthood, the Netherlands made a leap. In 2016,
the Dutch Government Committee on the Reassessment of
Parenthood (GCRP) proposed to legally facilitate parental
responsibility, as well as legal parenthood, for up to four
initial parents.109 Although the propositions were set aside
by the Dutch government in 2019 (see below, in the text
105

See ibid at 98 (E(63)).
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See Irène Théry & Anne-Marie Leroyer, eds, Filiation, origines,
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générationnelle (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2014) at 135–36, 143.

107

See ibid at 143.
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accompanying note 116ff), it is interesting to look at the
way in which the GCRP planned to legally accommodate
multi-parenthood, and what role intent plays in these
propositions.
In short, the GCRP envisioned legal
accommodation for multiple-parent families for a
maximum of four parents raising a child or children in up
to two households.110 In order to obtain legal recognition,
the GCRP propositions foresee the drafting of a written
contract by the prospective parents, together with its
approval by a court, before conception takes place.111 The
arrangement would be open for the prospective birth
mother and the prospective genetic parents and their
partners.112 After the judge approved the written contract
of the parents, the multi-parents would be able to proceed
by obtaining prenatal acceptance of parenthood. The
GCRP envisioned that all multi-parents would be listed on
the birth certificate from the moment of the child’s birth.113
Along with multi-parenthood, the propositions
also included a framework for multi-parenting rights for all
parents, likewise established from birth.114 For non-parents
who (also) play a significant role in child-rearing,
provisions were made for so-called multi-person110

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 430; GCRP, supra note 2 at 65.

111

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 434 (Recommendation 35); GCRP, supra
note 2 at 69 (Recommendation 35).

112

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 430; GCRP, supra note 2 at 65.
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114

See RSHO, supra note 9 at 447 (Recommendation 41(1); GCRP, supra
note 2 at 81 (Recommendation 41(1)).
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responsibility. 115 For this request to be successful, the
parties had to account for all modalities of the shared
parental tasks in a contract and, again, obtain approval by
a court. 116 Consequently, the Dutch GCRP proposed to
accommodate not only parental intent established during a
child’s later life but also, more importantly, initial parental
intent before a child is born, or even conceived.
The proposed changes by the GCRP show
substantive overlaps with many of the foreign practices
discussed earlier. First, the proposition of multi-parenting
rights (that is, a form of non-descent-based parental
responsibility) is also present in the legal framework of
England and Wales. Second and third, the committee also
proposed that the legalization of multi-parenthood should
be established in tandem with the prerequisite of a written
agreement prior to the child’s conception. This
recommendation is both in concurrence with the state of
the law in British Columbia and Ontario and with a judicial
review, as practiced in California.
The GCRP propositions will probably remain
devoid of consequences in the years to come. In a recent
letter to parliament,117 the Dutch government announced it
does not plan to fully endorse the recommendations of the
GCRP as outlined above. Arguments for the government’s
position are situated around three main points.118 First, the
115
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government states that precaution is advised in this matter,
alluding to the lack of empirical research findings in the
domain of multi-parenthood and children’s well-being, as
well as the perceived increase of conflicts within plus-twoparent families. Second, it has been suggested that the
practical implementation of legal multi-parenthood in
society would be too complex, for instance, with regard to
finance and social security administration. Third, the
government adds that, even if the Netherlands were to
implement a framework for multi-parenthood, this would
simply not be supported in the online state registration
system. Making this technically possible, according to the
government, would take not only effort and time but also
financial support from the Dutch taxpayer. Based on this
statement, it appears the GCRP report was too
controversial after all, and that the Netherlands is not ready
for the enactment of legal multi-parenthood or (full) multiparenting rights.
However, in concurrence with the GCRP report,
the government recognized that society is changing, as
plus-two-parent families are currently in existence.
Therefore, the government sees it as opportune to provide
at least a limited form of legal protection for social parents
under a system of delegation of parental responsibility.
These provisions differ drastically from those of the GCRP
in terms of legal protection. The current legal propositions
would be open for up to two social parents and would also
be accessible for step-parents and foster parents as long as
the number of social parents (next to the legally recognized
parents) does not exceed the number of two.119 The main
aim of the envisioned reforms is to facilitate the everyday
119

See ibid at 11.
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practice of social parents (for example, in a school context
or at the doctor’s office) rather than legally recognize these
parents.120 Social parents would be able to obtain a limited
form of parental responsibility, but the latter exclusively
remains within the powers and obligations of the legally
recognized holder of parental responsibility (hereafter:
recognized parent, generally the legal parent). 121 In
addition, only non-important, everyday decision-making is
delegable. Consequently, social parents would not be able
to make urgent medical decisions under this system, even
in cases where all recognized parents wanted to delegate
this power to non-legal parents in the multi-parent
constellation. In other words, the proposed system of
delegation does not, and cannot, lead to equal parental
status. When a conflict arises, the decision-making
capacity of the recognized parents will trump that of the
social parent(s), as the latter are unable to take the matter
to court.122
That said, social parent(s) who receive a form of
delegated parental responsibility, are also granted certain
rights. First, they are entitled to inquiry information
regarding the child’s medical file or school performance.123
This makes them recognizable for third parties. Second,
they can become legal guardians in the case of the decease
of (one of) the recognized parents.124 Third, social parents
have a veto right in the event that the recognized parents
120
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wish to make substantial changes in the arrangements of
care of the child that affect the social parent. The rationale
behind this is that it is not in the best interest of children to
lose contact with the social parent(s) by whom they were
co-raised. The envisioned veto right of the social parent(s),
however, can be overruled by a judge upon request by the
recognized parents.125 Therefore, the veto right might be at
risk of turning out to be an empty vessel in reality.
With these latest propositions, the government
plans to accommodate parental intent in a limited way,
although not on the basis of initial parental intent (preconception). In contrast, it appears the system of partial
responsibility would only be available for parents who
already play in important role in the child’s upbringing.126
In this vein, the government seems to favor established
family life over initial parental intent.
In addition, the government acknowledges the
possibility that the envisioned reforms are not far-reaching
enough for multi-parent families and refers to the need for
future evaluations of the legal changes to inquire whether
the measures are sufficient. The latter is doubtful given that
currently existing problems linked to the lack of legal
multi-parenthood, will remain under this new system.127
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM AND THE
NETHERLANDS
The comparative legal analysis provided above has shown
that various jurisdictions have taken different paths in their
quests to legally accommodate multi-parenthood. Other
jurisdictions have not (yet) taken any measures, rendering
multiple-parent families obligated to turn to the legal
instruments available (for example, simple adoption).
The jurisdictions that have actively taken steps
toward (a form of) legal accommodation, have done so
through different frameworks ranging from ultra-light
protection (for example, dual-paternity procedures with
limited parental rights), to light protection (multi-parenting
rights), to full equal protection (both legal multiparenthood and multi-parenting rights, established either
through judicial interference or written agreements).
Foreign legal changes are likely to function as sources of
inspiration for future legislative pathways in Belgium and
the Netherlands in the field of family law.
The Belgian government has acknowledged the
necessity of further modernization of family law, sparked
by the various forms of societal evolution occurring in
living arrangements. 128 The social reality of plus-twoparent families also appeared high on the political agenda

128

See (Belgian policy agreement) Regeerakkoord 9 October 2014.

INTENT TO PARENT IS WHAT MAKES A PARENT

319

of the Senate, 129 but did not lead to specific
recommendations in the legal field. Multi-parenthood was
deemed too complex and in need of additional research.130
The general policy report of the Belgian Ministry of Justice
of November 3, 2017 furthermore mentioned the need for
thorough reflection in the field of social parenthood. 131
More specifically, the policy report made mention of the
societal need to fine-tune both social and biological/genetic
forms of parenthood.132 To date, no legal propositions have
been made.
In
the
Netherlands,
multi-parenthood
recommendations have been made and have provoked
debates in the media. Shortly after the GCRP report was
presented in 2016, official reactions of the Ministry of
Justice quickly followed. At first, these were generally
positive, yet reflected a hint of tentativeness.133 In 2019,
the government announced it was not planning to introduce
multi-parenthood and multi-parenting rights, but instead, to
opt for a system of partial parental responsibility for a third
129
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and possibly a fourth social parent (see above, in the text
accompanying note 116 ff).
It is safe to say that multi-parenthood today is a
controversial issue and that there appears to be a lack of
consensus among European jurisdictions on how to solve
the issues that multiple-parent families confront.
Jurisdictions have a wide margin of appreciation when
deciding how to legally accommodate intentional plustwo-parent families.134 Based on the comparative analysis
presented in this article, legislatures aiming to provide (a
form of) legal recognition for intentional multi-parent
families have two options: the first possibility relates to
parental responsibility for more than two parents. Such
multi-parenting rights mean that legal parenthood remains
with the legal parents (with a maximum of two), while
parental responsibility that is traditionally linked to legal
parenthood is extended to non-legal parents and/or
caregivers. If this option is chosen, all parties involved
could draft a parental agreement in which they clarify their
shared intention. 135 In this regard the lack of a legal
position for social parents (zorgouders) was already
brought to light by the Belgian Senate through legislative
propositions in 2014 and 2015.136 However, the utility of
134
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multi-parenting rights (light protection) is questionable,
given the limited effects this can have in the life of all the
parties involved, for example, with respect to naming law
and inheritance.137
Taking the above-mentioned limitations into
consideration, a second possibility for legislatures is legal
parenthood for more than two parents. Such full protection
entails an equal legal position for all parental parties within
the letter of the law. The question remains, however, under
what modalities this legal recognition would be placed in
order to be granted.
There appeared to be a consensus within the Dutch
GCRP report of 2016 that initial parental intent would
become legally accommodable (full protection) under the
conditions outlined above. The new propositions envision
a different direction, one toward partial parental
responsibility (ultra-light protection) on the basis of social
parenthood instead of initial parental intent. It appears that
for many jurisdictions, the core question remains whether
intentional parenthood is in and of itself a sturdy basis for
assigning legal recognition. Based on its most recent
propositions, the current Dutch government seems to opine
this is not the case.
However, I argue that Susan Boyd was right in
claiming that a framework of parental recognition should
work toward legal parental recognition on the grounds of
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one’s intention to parent.138 In this article I have included
various interpretations of parental intent, as it is by no
means a “fixed notion occurring at one place at one point
in time.”139 Indeed, intent is a useful concept in order to
define who should and who should not be defined as a
parent, though it should not be the only concept. Keeping
this in mind, implementing a fair legal framework in which
the true diversity of multi-parenthood families (including
less normative ones) is reflected, will take time and effort.
This is true for most of the major changes in family
law over the last decades. Given the controversial debates
surrounding multi-parenthood, it is realistic to expect that
legislatures will aim to legally accommodate multiparenthood one step at a time. With the GCRP, the
Netherlands has already taken an important first step.
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